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Ireland among the Nations of the Earth:  
Ireland’s Foreign Relations from 1923 to 1949
Francis M. Carroll
St. John’s College – University of Manitoba
Abstract
Irish foreign relations shaped the process of Ireland’s emergence as a sovereign nation state. 
The channels through which this independent status were achieved and recognized were mem-
bership in the League of Nations, in which Ireland took an increasingly prominent part by the 
1930s; Commonwealth affairs, wherein Ireland worked persistently to expand the independent 
role of the Dominions; and bi-lateral relations, whereby Ireland expeditiously established 
diplomatic relations with the United States, France, Germany and the Vatican. By the late 
1930s Ireland was sufficiently autonomous to pursue a policy of neutrality during the Second 
World War, despite the involvement of Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, and by 
1949, now as the Republic of Ireland, to unilaterally exit the Commonwealth. Ireland’s foreign 
policy consolidated its independence.
Keywords: Irish sovereignty, League of Nations, Commonwealth affairs, bi-lateral relations, 
republicanism
Résumé
Les relations internationales ont été au cœur du processus d’émergence de l’Irlande comme état-
nation souverain. Les voies par lesquelles cette indépendance fut acquise et reconnue furent l’appar-
tenance à la Société des Nations où l’Irlande a joué un rôle de premier plan dans les années 1930 ; 
les Affaires du Commonwealth, au sein desquelles l’Irlande oeuvra en permanence pour étendre le 
degré d’indépendance des Dominions ; et les relations bilatérales qui ont permis à l’Irlande d’établir 
très rapidement des relations diplomatiques avec les États-Unis, la France, l’Allemagne et le Vatican. 
Avant la fin des années 1930, l’Irlande était suffisamment autonome pour adopter une politique de 
neutralité pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale en dépit de la participation active de la Grande-
Bretagne et du reste du Commonwealth, et pour sortir unilatéralement du Commonwealth en 1949 
en tant que république d’Irlande. La politique étrangère irlandaise consolida son indépendance.
Mots clés  : Souveraineté irlandaise, Société des Nations, Affaires du Commonwealth, relations 
bilatérales, républicanisme
“When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then, 
and not until then, let my epitaph be written.” These were the stirring words 
that concluded Robert Emmet’s famous speech from the dock in 1803, and they 
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became a rallying cry for Irish nationalists for over a century. Historians, however, 
have had a complicated relationship with these sentiments. They have certainly 
quoted Emmet regularly, and the Irish history they have written, consciously or 
unconsciously, has been largely a nationalist narrative. Irish history has for the 
most part focused on the struggle for political, religious, and economic rights, and 
the emergence of an Irish nation – a nation in the sense of some kind of sovereign 
entity 1. All of this has been important, showing the step-by-step process through 
which Ireland struggled to obtain self-government and independence and to assert 
its cultural identity. However, Emmet’s words ask that he be judged “when his 
country takes her place among the nations of the earth”, and that is literally a 
somewhat different narrative – Ireland within the international community. 
A  sampling of the leading histories of Ireland illustrates the point. The general 
histories by F.S.L. Lyons, Roy Foster, Alvin Jackson, and Thomas Bartlett, and 
the twentieth-century histories by J.J. Lee and Diarmaid Ferriter devote anywhere 
from a few lines to only several pages to foreign affairs matters in their substantial 
books – the League of nations, Dominion affairs, diplomatic recognition, and bi-
lateral relations. The exceptions to this generalization are the discussions of the 
land annuities-trade dispute with Britain in the 1930s, the issues surrounding the 
treaty ports, and Irish neutrality in the Second World War 2. It is the thesis of this 
article that foreign affairs, although seriously studied only in the last thirty years 
and almost exclusively by diplomatic historians, have also been a major part of the 
emergence of the Irish state and should be integrated into the national narrative 3.
It is surprising to be reminded that Dermot Keogh’s classic work, Ireland & 
Europe, 1919-1948, was published as recently as 1988, and Michael Kennedy’s 
Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946 came out only in 1996. Happily, 
other historical monographs have followed 4. Part of the credit for this has been 
1.  he title of Lawrence McCafrey’s widely read textbook, Ireland: From Colony to Nation State, illustrates the 
point. Lawrence J. McCafrey, Ireland: From Colony to Nation State, Englewood Clifs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979. 
Max Belof uses the terminology somewhat diferently. “It [Ireland] was not in its own view a colony that had 
achieved self-rule but a subject nation that had at last been recognized, though only in a truncated form.” Max 
Belof, Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-42, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1989, p. 77-78.
2.  hree major general histories of Ireland are, F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1971; Roy Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972, London, Allen Lane, 1988; Alvin Jackson, Ireland, 
1789-1998, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999; and homas Bartlett, Ireland, A History, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. he standard works on twentieth century Ireland are, Joseph J. Lee, Ireland, 
1912-1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; and Diarmaid Ferriter, he 
Transformation of Ireland, Woodstock, he Overlook Press, 2007. Shorter works include, John A. Murphy, 
Ireland in the Twentieth Century, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, Ltd., 1975; Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland, 
Dublin, Helicon Limited, 1983; and David Harkness, Ireland in the Twentieth Century: Divided Ireland, Bas-
ingstoke, Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996.
3.  Michael Kennedy warns that it is a mistake to see Ireland exclusively “in insular national terms divorced from 
concurrent events in Europe and a wider world…” Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations 1919-
1946: International Relations, Diplomacy and Politics, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 1996, p. 251.
4.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1988; and Michael Kennedy, 
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the consolidation in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the old Public Record 
Office at the Four Courts and the State Paper Office at Dublin Castle into a new 
National Archives of Ireland on Bishop’s Street. This was major structural change 
in the management of Irish government records, and, together with the release of 
manuscript material from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department 
of the Taoiseach, it has opened the door to serious research on foreign relations 5. 
Equally important has been the publication of a monumental series of Docu-
ments on Irish Foreign Policy, undertaken jointly by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the Royal Irish Academy. Volume one, 1919 to 1922, came out in 
1998 and the series is now up to volume nine, 1948-1951. The original editors 
were Ronan Fanning, of University College Dublin; Michael Kennedy, from the 
Royal Irish Academy; Dermot Keogh, from University College Cork; and Eunan 
O’Halpin, from Trinity College; and they were guided by an Advisory Board that 
included representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Natio-
nal Archives. The publication of this series of Documents on Irish Foreign Policy 
places Ireland in line with many other nation states, led by the United States, in 
making available to the public printed copies of the most important documents 
shaping their countries’ foreign relations. Of course, historians demand more 
than official publications and government documents to write history according 
to contemporary standards, but together with the manuscript materials available 
in the National Library of Ireland and particularly the University College Dublin 
archives, containing the papers of several members of W.T. Cosgrave’s government 
and more recently the de Valera papers, the opportunity now exists for sophistica-
ted research and writing about Ireland’s early diplomatic relations with the inter-
national community 6.
Of course, it should be acknowledged that Ireland had something of an inter-
national presence while still an integral part of the British Empire. The history of 
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is closely tied to the nume-
rous Irish links to the European continent. The Catholic Church was a consistent 
link and every major power in Europe had in its service at least one Irish regi-
op. cit. Two more recent collections of essays are, Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds.), Irish 
Foreign Policy, 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2000; and Ben 
Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle and Noel Dorr (eds.), Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 
2012.
5.  Gerard O’Brien, Irish Governments and the Guardianship of Historical Records, 1922-72, Dublin, Four Courts 
Press, 2004. he Royal Irish Academy also began publication of the journal, Irish Studies in International Afairs, 
in 1979, focused on both international relations and history.
6.  Extensive new biographies of both Cosgrave and de Valera are needed, but several of the existing studies devote 
some attention to questions of international relations during their time as the head of government. See Michael 
Lafan, Judging W.T. Cosgrave: he Foundation of the Irish State, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2014; he Earl of 
Longford and homas P. O’Neill, Eamon De Valera: A Biography, Boston, Houghton Milin Company, 1971; 
and Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow, London, Arrow Books, 1995.
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ment made up of exiles and adventurers defying English claims to allegiance. The 
bicentennial of the Rising of 1798 generated extraordinary studies of the French 
connection during the Revolution, and of course the Fenians in the 1860s have 
been the subject of steady interest in the US and Canada as well as in Ireland. 
Jérôme aan de Wiel’s new book, The Irish Factor, 1899-1919: Ireland’s Strategic 
and Diplomatic Importance for Foreign Powers, has shed new light on how much 
Ireland was taken into account in international relations during the early years 
of the twentieth century 7. Studies of the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-1914, the 
1916 Rising, the Irish efforts at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Anglo-
Irish War, and particularly Eamon de Valera’s trip to the United States in 1919 
and 1920, have all contained an international component. Various Irish nationa-
list groups, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, for example, attempted to open 
contacts with foreign countries (Germany, primarily), and the First and Second 
Dáil Éireann governments set up a putative Ministry of Foreign Affairs (second in 
expenditures to military affairs) 8. The centennials of the First World War and the 
1916 Rising will unquestionably stimulate historians to consider these internatio-
nal questions with fresh documents and new insights.
It was the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that gave Ireland a crucial element of cre-
dibility for international purposes. The Anglo-Irish Treaty established the twenty-
six counties of southern Ireland as a “Dominion”, which was to be called the Irish 
Free State and remain a member of the British Empire, soon to be referred to as 
the British Commonwealth of Nations. The King remained the head of state and 
an oath of allegiance to the sovereign was required. These concessions seriously 
divided those Irish who had fought for an Irish Republic. These divisions led to 
the outbreak of the Civil War in June of 1922, which was not put down until 
May of 1923, during which time the government of the new Irish Free State came 
into being. The divisions within Irish society colored Irish public life for several 
7.  Jérôme aan de Wiel, he Irish Factor, 1899-1919: Ireland’s Strategic and Diplomatic Importance for Foreign  Powers, 
Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2008. For a good brief account of historic Irish links abroad, see Patrick Keatinge, 
A Place Among the Nations: Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978, 
p. 9-63. Also useful is Stephen Hartley, he Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-18, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987.
8.  See Charles Callan Tansill, America and the Fight for Irish Freedom, 1866-1922, New York, Devin-Adair Compa-
ny, 1957; Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 1899-1921, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1969; and Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion and the Irish Question, 1910-23, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 
1978 and New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1978. For Irish and Irish-American activity at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence, see Francis M. Carroll (ed.), he American Commission on Irish Independence, 1919: he Diary, Correspon-
dence and Report, Dublin, Irish Manuscript Commission, 1985; and Pierre Ranger, “he World in Paris and 
Ireland too: he French Diplomacy of Sinn Féin, 1919-1921”, Études irlandaises, vol. 36, no 2 (2011), p. 39-57. 
For de Valera’s mission to the United States, see Patrick McCartan, With De Valera in America,  Dublin, Fitzpat-
rick, Ltd., 1932; Katherine O’Doherty, Assignment America: De Valera’s Mission to the United States, New York, 
De Tanko Publishers, 1957; and Dave Hannigan, De Valera in America: he Rebel President’s 1919 Campaign, 
Dublin, O’Brien Press, 2008. 
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generations and determined the context within which the Irish foreign affairs were 
to be shaped during the next twenty-five years 9.
Ignoring the shortcomings of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, what did “Dominion 
status” mean for the Irish Free State? Was Ireland still a colony or was it inde-
pendent? This was a fair question. In 1921, 1922, and 1923 it was not entirely 
clear 10. Canada was the first dominion, being given “Dominion status” in 1867. 
This had provided Canada with complete political independence, but then 
Canada had been comfortable with membership in the British Empire and the 
Commonwealth and to some extent looked to Britain for protection. However, 
during the First World War the now several dominions made substantial contri-
butions to the war effort, as a result of which they, and even Canada, expected 
some input into the decision making process. This was facilitated through the 
creation of an Imperial War Cabinet – meetings of the British and dominion 
Prime Ministers on a near equal basis. Thus, although the Dominions had been 
brought into the war by the decision of the British government, it was highly 
significant that they individually signed the Versailles Treaty ending the war. The 
dominions also entered the new League of Nations separately with other sovereign 
nations, rather than merely as part of a British delegation. So by 1922 and 1923, 
despite the acknowledgement of the King as the head of state and affiliation with 
Great Britain, the dominions enjoyed the status and practice of nation states – 
international legal persons 11.
When the Irish Free State came into being in December 1922 it already had 
the makings of both a diplomatic service and a foreign policy. The Dáil govern-
ments had sent substantial missions to Washington and Paris and envoys to 
Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Vatican. Joseph P. Walshe, Timothy Smiddy, 
Michael MacWhite, Sean Lester, John Chartres, and Charles Bewley succeeded 
to positions in the Free State diplomatic service, having started out representing 
the Dáil government 12. Count Plunkett was the first Dáil Minister of Foreign 
9.  See F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985, and Diarmaid Ferriter, he Transforma-
tion of Ireland.
10.  For discussions of what “Dominion status” meant in the 1920s see, A. Lawrence Lowell, “he Treaty-Making 
Power of Canada”, Foreign Afairs, vol. 2, no 1 (1923/24), p. 12-22; Herbert A. Smith, “Diplomacy and Inter-
national Status”, Canadian Bar Review, vol. 2, no 4 (April, 1924), p. 231-41; and Ciphos. D. Allin, “Recent 
Developments in the Constitutional and International Status of British Dominions”, Minnesota Law Review, 
vol. 10, no 100 (1925-26), p. 100-22.
11.  Some of these same issues are raised by Nicholas Mansergh in “Ireland and the British Commonwealth of 
Nations: he Dominion Settlement”, in Desmond Williams (ed.), he Irish Struggle, 1916-1926, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 129-39; and Roy E. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 
1918-39 (London, Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 1-23.
12.  Patrick Keatinge, “he Formative Years of the Irish Diplomatic Service”, Eire-Ireland, vol. 6, no 1 (Fall, 1971), 
p. 57-71; Dermet Keogh, op. cit., p. 5-33. Short sketches of the early Irish diplomats now exist in the Diction-
ary of Irish Biography, but more extensive works are Aengus Nolan, Joseph Walshe: Irish Foreign Policy, 1922-
1946, Cork, Mercier Press, 2008; Dermot Keogh, “Proile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary, Department of Foreign 
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Affairs, followed eventually by George Gavan Duffy, who in turn was succeeded 
in July 1922 by Desmond FitzGerald, who then became the first Free State Minis-
ter for External Affairs in December 1922. The thrust of the Dáil foreign policy 
had been primarily to obtain diplomatic recognition from the international com-
munity as a weapon to force Britain to concede Irish independence. In the after-
math of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Civil War, the Free State government had 
somewhat more complex needs. It still had to establish itself among the interna-
tional community of nations, and it also had to demonstrate to both its domes-
tic constituency and the overseas emigrant community that the Irish Free State 
was a sovereign state. To that end it was obliged to focus on “identity, legitimacy, 
symbolism, [and] status”, in the words of Conor Cruise O’Brien, an early com-
mentator on foreign affairs. The Free State, under the government of William T. 
Cosgrave, as Michael Kennedy has pointed out, pursued three tracks to establish 
its international presence: League of Nations policy, Commonwealth policy, and 
bi-lateral relations 13.
Membership in the League of Nations was the first track to yield results. 
Although warmly discussed by the Provisional government during the second half 
of 1922, a formal application was not submitted to the League secretariat until 17 
April 1923. The Irish Free State was admitted to the Assembly of the League at the 
next meeting in Geneva on 10 September 1923. President of the Executive Council 
William T. Cosgrave personally led the Irish delegation and addressed the Assem-
bly. Within ten days the Irish delegation began work to have the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
registered as an “international engagement”, with the intention of securing world 
recognition of the document as the basis for the Irish state. Furthermore, just below 
the surface was the thought that the Irish government could turn to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice for a resolution of the Northern Ireland boundary 
question if the Boundary Commission authorized in the Treaty did not work out. 
The British government wrote to the League Secretary General that the document 
was a domestic agreement, but the Treaty was registered nonetheless 14. This action 
Afairs, 1922-1946”, Irish Studies in International Afairs, vol. 3, no 2 (1990), p. 59-80; Douglas Gageby, he 
Last Secretary General: Sean Lester and the League of Nations, Dublin, Town House, 2000; Paul McNamara, 
Sean Lester, Poland and the Nazi Takeover of Danzig, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2008; Brian P. Murphy, John 
Chartres: Mystery Man of the Treaty, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 1991; Charles Bewley, Memoirs of a Wild 
Goose, Dublin, Lilliput Press, 1989; and Andreas Roth, Mr. Bewley in Berlin: Aspects of the Career of an Irish 
Diplomat, 1933-1939, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2000.
13.  Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Ireland in International Afairs”, in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise 
O’Brien Introduces Ireland (London, Andre Deutsch, 1969), p. 104; Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League 
of Nations, op. cit., p. 13; and Gerard Keown, “Taking the World Stage: Creating an Irish Foreign Policy in the 
1920s”, in Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle and Noel Dorr (eds), op. cit., p. 25-43.
14.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, op. cit., p. 27-72. Cosgrave is sometimes held to a state-
ment made in June of 1922 while Minister of Local Government in the Provisional Government, that he 
regarded foreign afairs as important only as it related to commercial activity, although when he assumed the 
Presidency of the Executive Council of the Free State he took quite a large role in Ireland’s external afairs. 
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was the first of several steps taken at the League to distinguish the Irish Free State 
from Great Britain and to give the Irish delegation a high profile in Geneva. As 
well as serving on various committees, Ireland took an increasingly prominent role 
among the smaller nations in the League. Ireland distinguished itself in 1926 by 
standing for election by the Assembly to the League Council in opposition to the 
slate of candidates based on geographical representation; in 1927 Ireland strongly 
supported the election of Canada to the Council; and in 1930 Ireland successfully 
won election to a seat on the Council itself for the important three years of 1930 
to 1933 15. These gestures were effective assertions of independence as both a small 
nation and a Dominion, prompting Patrick McGilligan, the Minister of Exter-
nal Affairs, to say, “we are recognized at Geneva as one of the main upholders of 
the complete independence of the smaller States 16…” Historians such as John P. 
McCarthy have downplayed the importance of Irish participation in League affairs, 
which with the benefit of hindsight may be true, but at the time the League was the 
great hope for the future 17. These activities were matters of great importance for Ire-
land’s standing in the international community.
The formation of a Fianna Fáil government in 1932 projected Eamon de 
Valera into prominence as both President of the Executive Council and Minister 
of External Affairs. De Valera pursued policies at the League similar to those of 
Cosgrave, but de Valera was presented with a far better platform when Ireland 
was given the rotating Presidency of the League Council and made Acting Pre-
sident of the Assembly. Although de Valera had been critical of the League in 
1919, in his opening speech to the Assembly on 26 September 1932 he suppor-
ted the League and wanted it to work to protect small nations through collec-
tive security, but he recognized that to be effective the League Covenant had to 
be enforced and member states had to fulfill their obligations. De Valera warned 
that world opinion was losing faith in the capacity of the League to protect peace 
and stability. “People are complaining that the League is devoting its activity to 
matters of secondary or very minor importance, while the vital international pro-
blems of the day… are being shelved or postponed or ignored”, de Valera told 
the Assembly 18. His frank language went beyond the usual diplomatic platitudes 
and earned him stature as a statesman at home and enhanced Ireland’s reputation 
George Gavan Dufy to W.T. Cosgrave, 20 June 1922, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume I, 1919 to 
1922, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 1998, p. 467.
15.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, op. cit., p. 129-88.
16.  Dáil Éireann deb., vol. 39, col. 1281; 1 July 1931.
17.  For his less enthusiastic view of the League of Nations, see John P. McCarthy, Kevin O’Higgins: Builder of the 
Irish State, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2006, p. 233-34.
18.  Norman MacQueen, “Éamon de Valera, the Irish Free State, and the League of Nations, 1919-46”, Eire-
Ireland, vol. 17, no 4 (Winter, 1982), p. 110-27. For the text of his speech to the League of Nations Assembly 
on 26 September 1932, see “League of Nations – he Testing Time”, in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and 
Statements by Eamon De Valera, 1917-1973, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980, p. 219-23.
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as an international force to be taken seriously. This was particularly important 
because de Valera still carried something of the stigma of an irresponsible rebel 19. 
During the Manchurian crisis in 1932 and the Abyssinian crisis of 1934-1936, 
de Valera warned that the League must take action to enforce international law 
and preserve peace 20. The League, of course, became increasingly side-tracked as 
a collective security organization as the international situation in Europe and the 
Far East deteriorated in the late 1930s. Ironically, de Valera was elected to the 
Presidency of the League Assembly in 1938, just as Adolph Hitler was threatening 
Czechoslovakia, although by that time he had concluded that Ireland must look 
to its own resources and to a policy of strict neutrality in the coming conflict in 
Europe. De Valera had to admit to the Dáil as early as 1936 that the League “does 
not command our confidence 21”.
The second avenue for Irish Free State objectives in the 1920s was its Com-
monwealth policy. Of course for anti-Treaty nationalists, membership in the 
Commonwealth itself was proof positive that the Irish Free State was still a 
colony. Nevertheless, Cosgrave led a delegation to the Imperial Conference in 
London on 1 October 1923 and was warmly welcomed. He found a situation 
in which the delegations from South Africa and Canada were also determined 
to assert sovereignty and independence within the Commonwealth. During the 
1926 Imperial Conference the Irish delegation worked closely with the South 
Africans and Canadians to produce a statement of what was by then the working 
relationship between Britain and the Dominions. These efforts emerged in the 
so-called Balfour Declaration, stating that Great Britain and the Dominions were 
“equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any of their domestic or 
19.  Kennedy notes that de Valera “developed a high proile at the League and was soon renowned as a statesman of 
world repute”. Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, op. cit., p. 162 and 189-225.
20.  De Valera was chairman of the Council session that accepted the Lytton Report on Manchuria and despite 
considerable support for Italy in Ireland voted for sanctions against Italy over that country’s invasion of Ab-
yssinia. In a speech to the League, de Valera said, “Make no mistake, if on any pretext whatever we were to 
permit the sovereignty of even the weakest state among us to be unjustly taken away, the whole foundation of 
the League would crumble into dust.” Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 57-61. For the text of de 
Valera’s speech to the Dáil on 18 June 1936 on the League’s failure to deal with the Abyssinian crisis, and for his 
the text of his speech to the League Assembly on 2 July 1936 on the same topic, see “Failure of the League of 
Nations”, and “Bitter Humiliation”, in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera, 
op. cit., p. 273-77 and 282-85.
21.  Patrick Keatinge, he Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, Dublin, Institute for Public Administration, 1973, 
p.  24. Also see, Michael Kennedy, “he Irish Free State and the League of Nations, 1922-32: he Wider 
Implications”, Irish Studies in International Afairs, vol. 3, no 4 (1992), 9-23; Stephen Barcroft, “Irish Foreign 
Policy at the League of Nations, 1929-1936”, Irish Studies in International Afairs, vol. 1, no 1 (1979), 19-29; 
and Norman MacQueen, “Eamon de Valera, the Irish Free State, and the League of Nations, 1919-46”, op. 
cit., p. 110-27. For the text of de Valera’s radio message to the United States through the League broadcasting 
studio in Geneva on 25 September 1938 on the Sudeten crisis, see “Peace or War?” in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), 
Speeches and Statement of Eamon De Valera, op. cit., p. 355-58.
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external affairs 22…” The conclusion was that these communities were united only 
by a common loyalty to the Crown. This was a remarkably clear statement of the 
functioning sovereignty and independence of the Dominions, giving rise to the 
famous quip by Kevin O’Higgins in response to the claim by the South African 
premier that the Dominions had brought home the bacon, yes, “Irish bacon 23”. 
The possibility of legislative supremacy was also removed by the Statute of West-
minster in 1931, which revoked nineteenth century legislation that gave Parlia-
ment the power to invalidate laws passed by colonial assemblies (similar to the 
Declaratory Acts of the 18th century) and acknowledged the claims in the Balfour 
Declaration that the Dominion legislatures were independent from any legisla-
tion passed by the British Parliament. Patrick McGilligan could tell the Dáil that 
“the system which it took centuries to build up had been brought to an end by 
four years of assiduous collaboration between the lawyers and the statement of 
the States of the Commonwealth 24”. The Cosgrave government committed itself 
to making the Commonwealth work for Ireland’s advantage, and in a lawyerly 
manner the door was opened for a re-thinking of the relationship between the 
Irish Free State and Great Britain 25. Once again de Valera was the beneficiary of 
the Cosgrave government’s accomplishments. When he came to power in 1932, 
de Valera could claim on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of 
Westminster that the Irish legislature had the power to amend and change the 
terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the constitution of the Irish Free State 26.
22.  Memorandum of Joseph P. Walshe on External Afairs and the Imperial Conference, 1 June 1927, Documents 
on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume III, 1926-1932, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2002, p. 129-31; and David 
Harkness, he Restless Dominion: he Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (New 
York, New York University Press, 1969), p. 87-134.
23.  Terence de Vere White, Kevin O’Higgins, Tralee, Anvil Books, 1966, p. 223. For the constructive role of Kevin 
O’Higgins at the 1926 Imperial conference, see McCarthy, Kevin O’Higgins, p. 234-37. John P. Deidre Mc-
Mahon dismisses much of the Commonwealth discussion of Dominion status with the phrase “a lot of cloudy 
wale about indivisible crowns and indissoluble unity”, but Donal Lowry makes a strong argument for the last-
ing importance of the Commonwealth connection for Ireland. See Deidre McMahon, “Ireland, the Empire, 
and the Commonwealth”, in Kevin Kenny (ed.), Ireland and the British Empire, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p. 221; and Donal Lowry, “he Captive Dominion: Imperial Realities Behind Irish Diplomacy, 
1922-49”, Irish Historical Studies, vol. 36, no 142 (November, 2008), p. 202-26.
24.  Dáil Éireann deb., vol. 39, col. 2291, 16 July 1931.
25.  Roy E. Holland commented that the early Irish Free State representatives were not “revolutionaries” so much 
as “good liberals implementing a program of eicient government”. Roy E. Holland, Britain and the Com-
monwealth Alliance, op. cit., p. 53-67 and 153. Deirdre McMahon observed about the Cosgrave government’s 
“achievements on the international stage, particularly in the shaping of the Commonwealth, were distin-
guished but fatally lacked public appeal”. Deirdre McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations 
in the 1930s, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984, p. 2. Also see David Harkness, he Restless Dominion, 
op. cit., p. 173-248; and Nicholas Mansergh, “Ireland and the British Commonwealth of Nations: he Do-
minion Settlement”, op. cit., p. 129-39. For the Irish view of the Statute of Westminster, see Press Statement 
by Patrick McGilligan on the Statute of Westminster, 11 December 1931, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, 
Volume III, 1926-1832, p. 883-84.
26.  Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland, op. cit., p. 111-20; and Roy F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth 
Alliance, op. cit., p. 152-66.
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Bi-lateral relations were still the third way the Irish Free State could pursue its 
independence. As mentioned before, the First and Second Dáil governments had 
worked very actively to devise a foreign policy that sought international recogni-
tion and had created the beginnings of a diplomatic service that was serving in 
several missions abroad when the Irish Free State came into existence. However, 
in 1922 and 1923 no Dominion had actual diplomatic relations with a foreign 
power. Was this possible? During the First World War the Canadian government 
felt the need for direct relations with the United States and subsequently worked 
out the protocols with both the British and the American governments, although 
no immediate appointment was made 27. Acting on this Canadian initiative, the 
Free State government arranged for Timothy A. Smiddy to be received as Irish 
Minister to the United States on 7 October 1924. This was the first Dominion 
diplomat accredited in a foreign capital, and its realization was in the view of the 
acting secretary of the Department of External Affairs, “the main accomplishment 
of our foreign relations 28”. The United States had established consular offices in 
Dublin, Cork, and Belfast, two of them since the 1790s, and on 27 July 1927 
the career diplomat Frederick A. Sterling opened the US Legation. This was an 
elaborate ceremony in Dublin, as Sterling was met in Dún Laoghaire by President 
Cosgrave and taken in a cavalcade with military escort to present his credentials to 
the Governor-General, all of which was fully covered by the newspapers and the 
motion picture newsreels 29.
Ireland had consulates and trade missions in Boston, New York, and San Fran-
cisco in the US and several European cities – legacies from the Dáil efforts to 
secure recognition during the Anglo-Irish War. In 1929 Count Gerald O’Kelly 
de Gallagh was appointed Minister to France, Charles A. Binchy Minister to 
Germany, and Charles Bewley Minister to the Vatican, and Legations were 
27.  For Canadian negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with the United States see, H. Gordon Skill-
ing, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1945), p.  200-16; 
C.P.  Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conlict: he Mackenzie King Era, 1921-1948 (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1981) vol. II, p. 89-97; and John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Afairs: he Early 
Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), vol. I, p. 81 and 111-13.
28.  Joseph P. Walshe to the Private Secretary of the Minister of Justice, 21 October 1924, Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy, Volume II, 1923-1924 (Dublin, Irish Royal Academy, 2000), p. 360.
29.  Bernadette Whelan, United States Foreign Policy and Ireland: From Empire to Independence, 1913-29 (Dublin, 
Four Courts Press, 2006), p. 346-526; and Troy D. Davis, “Diplomacy as Propaganda: he Appointment 
of T.A. Smiddy as Irish Free State Minister to the United States”, Eire-Ireland, vol. 31, nos 3 & 4 (Winter, 
1996), 117-29. he Secretary of the Department of External Afaires, Joseph P. Walshe, wrote to the Minister 
of Justice shortly after Smiddy had presented his credentials in Washington, pointing out that this appoint-
ment was “the main accomplishment in our external relations”… He further noted that “America is the only 
country with which our relations are entirely free and independent from any outside control”, and that these 
direct bi-lateral took foreign afairs out of the hands of the Foreign Oice in London. Joseph P. Walshe to the 
Private Secretary to the Minister of Justice, 22 October 1924, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume II, 
1923-1926, p. 360.
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opened in the next decade in Belgium, Spain, Italy, Canada, Switzerland, and Por-
tugal. The promotion of trade and tourism was a significant part of the duties of 
these diplomats, but even more important was the task of sending a message to 
the international community, as well as to the Irish communities at home and 
abroad, that Ireland had taken her place among the nations of the earth. Diplo-
matic relations were seen as the hallmark of sovereignty. As Desmond Fitzge-
rald, the Minister of External Affairs asserted on the eve of recognition by the 
United States, recognition “means we, as a sovereign State, speak directly to other 
sovereign States through our own fully-accredited Plenipotentiary 30”. To drive 
home this message, Cosgrave undertook a very public visit to the United States 
and Canada in January 1928, in which he visited and spoke to Irish groups in 
Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, and Ottawa. The highlight of his trip was a 
luncheon with President Calvin Coolidge in Washington and ceremonies in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Here was the head of an Irish 
government meeting with the President of the United States in the White House 
and with political leaders in Congress, all of which was reported in newspa-
pers and motion picture newsreels in Ireland and abroad. Partially as a result of 
this visit, Cosgrave also went to Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact on 
27 August 1928, and he accompanied Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg back 
to Dublin for a highly publicized official visit, the first visit to Ireland by a senior 
American statesman 31. This was an extraordinary compliment to Ireland because 
Kellogg was only the third Secretary of State to visit Europe while in office.
The Irish Free State made tremendous strides in establishing itself as inde-
pendent at the League of Nations, through the several Commonwealth meetings, 
and through international diplomacy. Even de Valera was obliged to acknowledge 
privately that: “They [the Cosgrave government] had done a magnificent job 32.” 
When Eamon de Valera came into office in 1932 he took the External Affairs 
portfolio himself. He also retained Joseph P. Walshe as Secretary of External 
Affairs, thus maintaining continuity in shaping a professional foreign service, 
but Irish foreign affairs were given a new focus. Commonwealth participation, 
in which Ireland had been very active, was de-emphasized and overseas relations, 
such as with the United States, became less central. De Valera had more ambi-
tious plans for changing Ireland’s bi-lateral relations with Britain, which became 
a central theme of de Valera’s foreign and domestic policies and which he could 
30.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 23-33; and Dáil Éireann deb., vol. 8, col. 803; 9 July 1924.
31.  Bernadette, Whelan, United States Foreign Policy and Ireland, op. cit., p. 556-60; Francis M. Carroll, “he Irish 
Free State and Public Diplomacy: he First Oicial Visit of William T. Cosgrave to the United States”, New 
Hibernia Review, vol. 16, no 2 (Summer, 2012), p. 77-97; and Francis M. Carroll, “Protocol and International 
Politics, 1928: he Secretary of State Goes to Ireland”, Eire-Ireland, vol. 26, no 4 (Winter, 1991), 45-57.
32.  From an interview with Vivion de Valera by Tim Pat Coogan, in Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: Long fellow, Long 
Shadow, op. cit., p. 426.
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do legally on the strength of the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of West-
minster 33. Relations with Britain were initially strained by de Valera’s decision to 
retain the land annuities payments – effectively the repayment of the earlier loans 
to enable Irish farmers to purchase land from landlords. In retaliation the British 
government placed import duties on Irish cattle and dairy products, leading to 
a six-year trade dispute. Paralleling these matters, de Valera began work revising 
the constitution of the Irish Free State, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the 
King, diminishing the role of the Governor-General, and later dissolving the 
Senate. The abdication of King Edward VIII in December of 1936 also provided 
the opportunity to remove reference to the King and the Governor-General in the 
existing constitution. The king retained a role in the appointment of Irish diplo-
mats and Ireland remained a member of the Commonwealth. Following talks 
between de Valera and Malcolm MacDonald, the Dominion Secretary, in London 
on 14 January 1937, the door was opened for a settlement of the land annuities 
and other issues. By spring of 1937 de Valera had put together a new constitution 
that, among other things, confirmed the changed relationship with Britain, pro-
vided for an elected President, and created a new Seanad. Ireland was effectively 
independent from Great Britain and with a tenuous connection to the Empire 
and the Commonwealth. De Valera’s statement in the Dáil in April of 1935 was 
becoming a fact: “Though we are in the British Commonwealth to-day we are not 
of it 34.” Ireland was an independent republic in all but name, as many have said, 
albeit without the six counties of Northern Ireland.
Although the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s reputation is 
forever colored by his unsuccessful dealings with Adolph Hitler and his failure 
to get Britain in a state of readiness to meet the war crisis in the late 1930s, it 
must be said that his policy of “appeasement” toward the Irish was a success. In 
February 1938 agreement was reached resolving the annuities question through 
a single payment to Britain of £10,000,000 and the extension to Ireland of pre-
ferential trade access to British markets and the restoration of the bases at Cobh, 
Lough Swilly, and Berehaven, held by the Royal Navy under the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty. The settlement of these issues was a major accomplishment in terms of 
both normalizing Ireland’s bi-lateral relations with Britain and enhancing Ireland’s 
independence on the eve of the war 35. The return of the naval bases particularly 
33.  Fanning says that de Valera wanted to “bend the machinery of government to his own purpose, not dismantle 
it”. However, the combination of international events and de Valera’s own objectives led to profound changes 
in Irish foreign policy. Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland, op. cit., p. 109. Also see, Aengus Nolan, Joseph 
Walshe, op. cit., p. 58-59.
34.  Dáil Éireann deb., vol. 55, col. 2276; 10 April 1935; and Alan J. Ward, he Irish Constitutional Tradition: 
Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782-1992 (Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America 
Press, 1994), p. 212-95.
35.  he irst steps in easing the land annuities-trade dispute came in the 1934 coal-cattle agreements. See Paul 
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had two important consequences for Ireland. First, it allowed Ireland to be neutral 
and to stay out of the war in a way that would have been quite impossible if Royal 
Navy ships had been sailing from several ports in Éire. Second, it ensured a degree 
of domestic tranquility during the war by removing a series of targets that would 
have been irresistible to the IRA.
As the 1930s unfolded, the international situation darkened. The ominous 
shadow of war spread across Asia, Africa, and Europe, and international relations 
took on a more life-and-death urgency. Moreover, as the League of Nations decli-
ned, de Valera had to deal with more dangerous international problems 36. Neu-
trality, one area of foreign policy that has been closely examined by historians, 
became the deliberate choice by the de Valera government and appears to have 
been widely supported throughout the country. “Neutrality has given the people 
more faith in what the Government has achieved for the independence of this 
country than any other act of theirs”, Joseph P. Walshe, Secretary of the Depart-
ment of External Affairs 37 wrote. Indeed, it has been argued that joining the Allies 
would have divided the country, revived the IRA, and brought civil war back to 
Ireland. Although de Valera seems to have had no misgivings about his decision 
to keep Ireland out of the war, he came under intense pressure to join the Allies 
from the two foreign powers that were most important to Ireland – Britain and 
the United States 38. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s veiled assurance 
that if Ireland entered the war the partition would be ended was turned down by 
de Valera, and strong urgings by American Minister David Gray and other offi-
cials were also rebuffed. Indeed, the mission of Frank Aiken, Minister of Defence, 
to the United States in April of 1941 to appeal directly to President Roosevelt 
for military aid met with a very frosty reception. When Aiken indicated that 
Ireland needed weapons to defend against an invasion by the British, Roosevelt 
said: “Nonsense… England is not going to invade you. It’s a preposterous sugges-
Canning, British Policy Towards Ireland, 1921-1941 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 121-220; and McMa-
hon, Republicans and Imperialists, p. 157-62 and p. 222-26. For a glimpse of these events from the perspective 
of de Valera’s role, see Longford and O’Neill, Eamon de Valera: A Biography, p. 273-326; T. Ryle Dwyer, De 
Valera’s Finest Hour, 1932-1959 (Cork, Mercier Press, 1982), p. 51-114; and Coogan, De Valera, p. 430-60.
36.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, p. 189-257. De Valera strongly supported Chamberlain 
in the Munich crisis.
37.  Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera, 1 July 1940, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, 
Volume VI, 1939-1941 (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2008), p. 271-72. Just a week and a half earlier Walshe 
had assured de Valera that “Britain’s defeat has been placed beyond all doubt”. Memorandum from Joseph P. 
Walshe, 21 June 1940, Ibid., p. 249-50. Also see Trevor C. Salmon, Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and 
Unique Security Policy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 82-119.
38.  T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939-47 (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1977), p. 1-23 and 179-
200; T. Ryle Dwyer, Guests of the Nation: he Story of Allied and Axis Servicemen Interned in Ireland During 
World War II (Dingle, Brandon Books, 1994), passim; Ian S. Wood, Britain, Ireland and the Second World War 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 1-19; and John A. Murphy, “Irish Neutrality in Historical 
Perspective”, in Brian Girvin and Geofrey Roberts, Ireland and the Second World War, op. cit., p. 7-23.
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tion 39.” Bi-lateral relations between Ireland and the United States reached an all-
time low in 1944 with Gray’s strongly worded note that the German and Japanese 
missions be closed 40. In terms of practical politics, however, Ireland’s neutrality 
was practiced in ways that were highly beneficial to the Allies – more “non-bel-
ligerency” than impartial neutrality. Atlantic weather reports and the movement 
of ships in coastal waters were broadcast in English, anti-submarine flights were 
given permission to over-fly Irish territory, Allied prisoners were well treated and 
allowed to “escape” across the border, and thousands of Irish were free to join the 
British forces or work in British war industries 41. More confidentially, Irish police 
and military intelligence and the Irish Ministry for External Affairs worked closely 
with British intelligence and the Dominions Office to insure that no clandestine 
German activity could take place and that no security breaches jeopardized Allied 
operations, such as the Normandy invasion. Early in the crisis extended plans 
were developed with the British about what joint operations could be mounted 
if the Germans did invade 42. That said, de Valera maintained highly public rela-
39.  Letter from Robert Brennan to Joseph P. Walshe 10 April 1941, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume 
VII, 1941-1945 (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2010), p. 44-46; T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations: Ireland at 
Peace and the USA at War, 1941-45 (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1988), p. 118-54; Paul Bew (ed.), A Yankee 
in de Valera’s Ireland: he Memoir of David Gray (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2012), passim. Also see Joseph 
Rosenberg, “he 1941 Mission of Frank Aiken to the United States: An American Perspective”, Irish Historical 
Studies, vol. 22, no 86 (September, 1980), p. 162-77; Raymond James Raymond, “David Gray, the Aiken Mis-
sion, and Irish Neutrality, 1940-41, Diplomatic History, vol. 9, no 1 (Winter, 1985), p. 55-71; and Dwyer, Irish 
Neutrality, p. 107-21. Aiken was understood to have said in Portugal on his way to the United States that Ire-
land would have no objection to a German victory in the war, and his subsequent courting of Irish-American 
groups hostile to the Roosevelt administration did not help his mission either.
40.  For the provocative request, see Letter from David Gray to Eamon de Valera, “he American Note”, 21 Febru-
ary 1944, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Volume VII, 1941-1945, p. 379-80. Also see Troy D. Davis, Dub-
lin’s American Policy: Irish-American Diplomatic Relations, 1945-1952 (Washington, D.C., Catholic University 
of America Press, 1998), p. 1-28.
41.  homas E. Hachey, he Rhetoric and Reality of Irish Neutrality”, New Hibernia Review, vol. 6, no 4 (Winter, 
2002), p. 26-43; Trevor C. Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, op. cit., p. 120-54; and Patrick Keatinge, A Singular 
Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984), p. 17-24. he exact 
igures of Irish citizens serving in the British forces seems impossible to determine, but at least 42,665 were 
identiied by the British government, while 165,000 listed Irish addresses for next of kin. he number of Irish 
citizens who worked in British industries during the war is also di cult to calculate, but the igure may be 
something between 172,574 and 189,942. See Richard Doherty, “Irish Heroes of the Second World War”, and 
Tracey Connolly, “Irish Workers in Britain During World War Two”, in Brian Girvin and Geofrey Roberts 
(eds.), Ireland and the Second World War (Dublin Four Courts Press, 2000), p. 91-95 and 121-32; and Eunan 
O’Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World War (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008).
42.  Eunan O’Halpin, ibid.; and Carolle Carter, “Ireland: America’s Neutral Ally, 1939-1941”, Eire-Ireland, vol. 12, 
no 1 (Spring, 1977), p. 5-13. For Irish relations with Germany, see, Niall Keogh, Con Cremin: Ireland’s Wartime 
Diplomat (Cork, Mercier Press, 2008), p. 18-93. For Irish relations with Germany see Michael Kennedy, “Our 
Men in Berlin: Some houghts on Irish Diplomats in Germany, 1929-39”, Irish Studies in International Afairs, 
vol. 10 (1999), p. 53-70; Mervyn O’Driscoll, Ireland, Germany and the Nazis: Politics and Diplomacy, 1919-
1939 (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2004); and John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the hird Reich (Dublin, 
Gill & Macmillan, 1989).
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tions with the German Legation, to the extent of paying his condolences on 
2 May 1945 on the death of Adolph Hitler – what Dermot Keogh considers to 
have been “the worst decision of his sixteen-year term as Minister of External 
Affairs 43”. This infuriated the Allies, led to Churchill’s public criticism of Ireland 
in the course of his victory speech, and served to isolate Ireland in the post-war 
era. It should be said that de Valera’s measured reply to Churchill in a radio 
speech won him great praise in Ireland, but probably less so in Britain and the 
United States. However, this gesture did highlight the degree to which Ireland had 
pursued a foreign policy distinctly independent from that of Great Britain and the 
United States. “Neutrality”, Patrick Keatinge concluded, was “the ultimate proof 
of sovereignty 44…” No one could doubt Ireland’s sovereignty or independence.
The Second World War ended with Ireland’s independence well demonstra-
ted, but with the avenues of its early foreign policy in disarray and destined to 
get worse. The League of Nations had been overtaken by the events of the war 
and rendered irrelevant. The closing meeting of the Assembly was held in April 
of 1946. In the meantime the United Nations had held its organizational meeting 
in San Francisco in May of 1945 and its first meeting of the General Assembly 
in November. The United Nations had looked like a victors’ club to many in the 
Irish Ministry of External Affairs and no effort had been made to be included in 
the early organization of the association 45. When Ireland did apply for member-
ship in the summer of 1946 (“without enthusiasm”, in the words of Conor Cruise 
O’Brien) the application was vetoed by the Soviets 46.
Commonwealth relations might have offered a means of maintaining wor-
kable links with similar countries, but Ireland had distanced itself from the 
Commonwealth both before and during the war 47. In the February 1948 general 
43.  he visit was “was an egregious error in judgment”, Keogh concludes. Keogh, Ireland and Europe, p. 191; Clair 
Wills, hat Neutral Ireland: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War (London, Faber and 
Faber, 2007), p. 383-422; and Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years, 1939-1945 (Newton Abbot, David 
& Charles, 1975), p. 160-79.
44.  Patrick Keatinge, “Unequal Sovereigns: he Diplomatic Dimension of Anglo-Irish Relations”, in P.J. Drudy 
(ed.), Ireland and Britain Since 1922 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 142. In his radio 
broadcast to the Irish nation on 16 May 1945 de Valera asked why, in a war ostensibly fought to resist ag-
gression and the violation of international law, Churchill, in the moment of victory, would raise the issue of 
the possible invasion of Éire on the basis of Britain’s national self interest. See “National hanksgiving”, in 
Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Eamon De Valera, p. 47-77. Although F.S.L. Lyon’s analogy of the 
watchers in Plato’s cave, observing the shadows of others on the wall, has been strongly criticized, Ireland’s 
successful neutrality did tend to leave the country outside the most cataclysmic and transformational events of 
the century. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, op. cit., p. 551.
45.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, p. 247-50; and Troy D. Davis, Dublin’s American Policy, 
op. cit., p. 29-57.
46.  Gerard O’Brien, “Ireland in International Afairs”, op. cit., p. 127.
47.  Dermot Keogh shows that the Soviet attitude towards Irish membership in the United Nations was at least partial-
ly inluenced by Ireland’s neutrality during the war, by the country’s alleged sympathy for the Axis Powers, and by 
the supposedly “fascist” nature of de Valera’s government. Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 202-205.
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elections a coalition government headed by John A. Costello of the Fine Gael 
replaced that of Eamon de Valera after sixteen years. Sean MacBride, who had 
been IRA Chief of Staff in 1936, but who had formed his own constitutional 
party called Clann na Poblachta, was made Minister for External Affairs. In the 
following July both MacBride and Costello made public statements that Éire was 
not a member of the Commonwealth, McBride repeating three times in the Dáil 
that, “We are clearly not part of the British Commonwealth. We are clearly a 
sovereign and independent state 48”. Nevertheless, Costello went off to a meeting 
of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Ottawa in September 1948. Historians 
are still probing the subsequent sequence of events and the matters of cause and 
effect 49. On 5 September the Dublin Sunday Independent reported that the Exter-
nal Relations Act – the link with the Crown – would be repealed. Two days later, 
on 7 September, while in Ottawa, Costello confirmed that the legislation would 
be “ditched”, and back in Dublin MacBride and colleagues began drafting legis-
lation to repeal the External Relations Act. This became the Republic of Ireland 
Bill 1948 which broke the Commonwealth connection and changed the name of 
the country from Éire to the Republic of Ireland. MacBride and others had made 
no secret of their sentiments about a republic and about the Commonwealth, but 
had the Cabinet worked out a plan earlier in the summer? Or had Costello been 
so angered by the imperious manner of Lord Alexander of Tunis, the Governor-
General of Canada and the host at the Ottawa meetings, that he impetuously 
went ahead and set in motion the termination of the Commonwealth link and 
finalized the republican status of Ireland? The British response to these announce-
ments was to withdraw the invitation to Costello to participate in the next Com-
monwealth Prime Ministers conference and to pass the Northern Ireland Bill 
1949, in which Parliament assured Northern Ireland that there would be no 
change in the status of the province without the consent of the Stormont legis-
lature. This seemed a major blow to the aspirations of both Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael to bring the six counties back into the country 50.
Bi-lateral relations with the United States, Britain, and even France were at 
a low point largely because of Ireland’s neutrality policy during the war. Close 
relations between the Irish legation and the Vichy government during the war 
48.  Dáil Éireann deb., vol. 112, cols. 988, 1019, and 1020; 21 July 1948.
49.  Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland, op. cit., p. 177-80; and J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1910-1985, p. 300-402.
50.  Ian McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland, 1948-49: he Republic, the Commonwealth and NATO (Dublin, 
Irish Academic Press, 1991), p. 20-96; Ronan Fanning, “he Response of the London and Belfast Govern-
ments to the Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948-49”, International Afairs, vol. 58, no 1 (Winter, 
1981-82), p. 95-114; and D.W. Dean, “Final Exit? Britain, Eire, the Commonwealth and the Repeal of the 
External Relations Act, 1945-1949”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 20, no  3 (1992), 
p. 391-418. Lowry shows that de Valera would have kept Ireland in the Commonwealth and in fact consulted 
with India about membership in the Commonwealth as a republic. Lowry, “he Captive Dominion: Imperial 
Realities Behind Irish Diplomacy”, p. 223-28.
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proved to be a problem by 1944 and 1945, following the liberation of France 51. 
The opportunity to rebuild ties to the United States was lost in February of 1949 
when Ireland was invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as it was 
being formed. MacBride insisted that Ireland could join an alliance with Britain 
only on the condition that the six counties of Northern Ireland were united with 
the Republic, although by this time the idea of non-alignment, not to mention 
neutrality, was also a factor 52.
Looking at the history of the first twenty-five years of independence, it is 
important to keep in mind that Ireland persistently pursued its own interests 
through a multi-dimensional foreign policy and met both with brilliant success 
and discouraging setbacks. From 1923 on Irish governments and their diploma-
tic service had invested great amounts of time and energy to making a success of 
international relations.
One may or may not agree with Conor Cruise O’Brien’s observation that in its 
first twenty-five years, “the Irish State played a more momentous and influential 
part in international affairs than it was ever to play again 53”. Ireland had pursued 
an assertive foreign policy distinct from, if not actually in defiance of, the great 
powers. Ireland achieved and maintained its independence, but at a cost. Michael 
Kennedy has claimed that it would take Ireland over a decade “to recover the posi-
tion she had lost during the war”, although of course eventually she did 54. The 
country had an international presence and diplomatic relations with a number of 
countries, although relations were quite strained with the most important ones – 
the United States, Britain, and France. What must be kept in mind is that these 
international matters were an integral part of Ireland’s emergence as a nation 
51.  Dermot Keogh notes that by 1945 relations with both France and the United States were strained. However, 
he concludes that the public exchange between Churchill and de Valera when the war ended did not have any 
lasting consequences, in part because of a change of government in Britain in July. Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 
op. cit., p. 182-90 and 190-200; and Dermot Keogh, “Ireland, de Gaulle and World War II”, in Pierre Joan-
non (ed.), De Gaulle and Ireland (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1991), p. 23-52; and Robert 
Patterson, “Ireland, Vichy and Post-Liberation France, 1938-50”, in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison 
Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 96-115.
52.  James I. McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland, op. cit., p. 97-148; Paula L. Wylie, Ireland and the cold 
War: Diplomacy and Recognition, 1949-63, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2006; and Davis, Dublin’s American 
Policy, p. 95-173; and Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1957 (Dublin, Four Courts 
Press, 2000).
53.  Gerard O’Brien, “Ireland in International Afairs”, op. cit., p. 108-09. Perhaps a more generous explanation 
might be found in Lyon’s conclusion, “At the very moment when she [Ireland] had achieved stability and full 
independence, and was ready to take her place in the society of nations, that society dissolved and she was 
thrown back upon her own meagre resources”. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, op. cit., p. 551.
54.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, op. cit., p. 250. Keogh argues that the view that Ireland was 
isolated by 1945 is “quite mistaken”, although he is quite critical of the “inexperience and impetuosity” of de 
Valera’s successors in 1948 and 1949. Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 208 and 211-12. Also see, 
homas E. Hachey, “Nuanced Neutrality and Irish Identity: An Idiosyncratic Legacy”, in homas E. Hachey 
(ed.), Turning Points in Twentieth-Century Irish History (Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2011), p. 77-102.
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state and not just a series of interesting anecdotes. The international history must 
become part of the national narrative. It has been the process through which 
Ireland has fulfilled the charge embodied in Robert Emmet’s speech from the 
dock for Ireland to take her place “among the nations of the earth”. Certainly 
with the current availability of both manuscript and published documents and a 
growing body of monographs and special studies, Ireland’s international history 
will become a central part of an understanding of the emergence of the modern 
Irish state.
